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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE---"DRUG COURIER PROFILE" CHAR-
ACTERISTICS ARE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH REASONABLE SUSPI-
CION OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT. United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct.
1581 (1989).
Between July 22 and July 25, 1984,1 Andrew Sokolow and a
companion traveled from Honolulu, Hawaii to Miami, Florida and
back to Honolulu, a trip of 20 hours in route to and from Miami with
only a 48-hour stay in Miami.2 Upon their return to Honolulu Inter-
national Airport, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers
forcibly stopped and questioned Sokolow and his companion.3
When the DEA agents stopped Sokolow they already knew sev-
eral facts about his trip that matched their "drug courier profile."
They knew that: (1) Sokolow paid $2,100 in cash for the two airplane
tickets from a roll of $20 bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did
not match the name under which his telephone number was listed;
(3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs;
(4) he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours; (5) he appeared nervous
during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage.4
After questioning Sokolow and his companion,- the DEA agents
took them to a DEA office in the airport where a narcotics detector
dog examined their luggage. When the dog reached Sokolow's shoul-
der bag, it alerted the agents. While obtaining a search warrant, the
agents placed Sokolow under arrest and advised him of his constitu-
tional rights.6
The agents found no drugs in the bag, but they did find that it
1. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987).
2. United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1582 (1989).
3. 831 F.2d at 1415. The agents grabbed Sokolow by the arm, pulled him onto the walk-
way, and sat him down. The agents then asked him for his airline ticket and identification.
The district court originally held the stop to be an impermissible seizure. 808 F.2d 1366 (9th
Cir. 1987). However, when the government offered additional evidence, the court vacated this
decision and ruled against the government on broader grounds. 831 F.2d at 1424.
4. 109 S. Ct. at 1582. The Court also stated twice in the facts that Sokolow was dressed
in a black jumpsuit and wore gold jewelry. It did not specify if the suspect's apparel should be
considered in establishing a reasonable suspicion or used simply for identifying the suspect. Id.
at 1583-84.
5. The facts of the case do not reveal the amount of time that Sokolow was detained for
questioning. He was stopped at 6:41 p.m. 831 F.2d at 1415. He was allowed to leave at 9:30
p.m., but probable cause for his arrest arose at an unspecified time during his detainment. 109
S. Ct. at 1584.
6. 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
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contained various documents implicating Sokolow's involvement in
drug trafficking.7 The dog reexamined the remaining luggage and
alerted the agents to another bag, but the agents could not obtain a
second warrant until the following morning.' The agents released
Sokolow but retained his luggage. The next morning, after a second
dog confirmed the first dog's alert, the agents obtained a search war-
rant and found 1,063 grams of cocaine inside Sokolow's bag.9 He was
then indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.10
At trial, Sokolow entered a guilty plea conditioned upon preserv-
ing his right to appeal the district judge's decision on his fourth
amendment claims. Sokolow's claims were based on his detention at
the airport and the search of his luggage without reasonable suspi-
cion."1 The United States District Court for Hawaii found that the
DEA agents had a reasonable suspicion that Sokolow was involved in
drug trafficking when they stopped him at the airport.1 2 A divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed," 3 hold-
ing that there was no sufficient evidence of "ongoing criminal activ-
ity" to satisfy its understanding of the requirements for "reasonable
suspicion". Therefore, the agents' stop was impermissible. 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari15 and, in a
seven-to-two decision, reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court said a
reasonable suspicion that Sokolow was carrying illegal drugs existed
when the DEA agents stopped him. The Court also noted that
although an agent must show specific and articulable facts to establish
reasonable suspicion, the significance of these factors is not lessened
by being listed in a "profile." United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct.
1581 (1989).
The Supreme Court has decided numerous cases defining the
coverage of the fourth amendment's search and seizure protections.
7. Id.
8. Id. Since it was 9:30 p.m. when the dog alerted the agents to the second bag, it was
apparently too late in the evening for the agents to obtain a warrant.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 808 F.2d at 1368.
12. 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
13. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413.
14. Id. at 1420-21. The court developed a two-category test to determine the existence of
reasonable suspicion. The first category consisted of facts of "ongoing criminal activity." The
majority ruled that at least one factor of "ongoing criminal activity" must always be found to
establish reasonable suspicion. The second category identified factors describing "personal
characteristics" which the suspect had in common with the innocent traveler. These factors
were only relevant if evidence of "ongoing criminal activity" was shown. Id. at 1419-21.
15. United States v. Sokolow, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
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However, its decisions have not indicated any consistent approach for
the government to take to ensure these safeguards.' 6 This "non-ap-
proach" strategy has left unanswered the basic question of what par-
ticular methods should (or should not) be used by law enforcement
officers when conducting a search or seizure.
The fourth amendment remained largely unexplored until the
Supreme Court's decision in Boyd v. United States ' 7 almost 100 years
after the ratification of the Bill of Rights."8 Since that time, "[n]o area
of the law has more bedeviled the judiciary, from the Justices of the
Supreme Court down to the magistrate ....
Generally, the fourth amendment guarantees that the people can
be secure in their houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and that no warrants, either search or arrest,
will be issued unless based upon probable cause.20 While the implica-
tions of the amendment are great, the ambiguous language has given
rise to much debate and criticism. 2I For example, the amendment
does not define the term "unreasonable" as it applies to search and
seizure.22 The amendment also fails to define the relationship between
the "unreasonableness clause" and the "warrant clause."23
Before the issue of unreasonableness can be addressed, the Court
must first decide if a search or seizure actually occurred.24 In deter-
mining what constitutes a search or seizure, the Court must find gov-
16. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 364
(1974).
17. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court held that the forced production of personal papers
was a search and that the search was unreasonable. Id. at 622-25. The Court also linked the
fourth and fifth amendment together to produce a broad privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 630-35.
18. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETA-
TION 25 n.2 (CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1987).
19. Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 349 (quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course
of True Law ... Has Not ... Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
21. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42 (1966).
22. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.1, at 5 (1978).
23. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 21, at 42. Two interpretations of the fourth amendment
have emerged. One view follows the theory that a search is unreasonable unless the warrant
requirement is met. The other view claims that a warrant is not required if the search is
reasonable. Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 358.
24. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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ernment action25 and an intrusion into an individual's protected
area.2 6 If the intrusion is not a search or seizure, then the individual
cannot claim any protection under the fourth amendment. 27 This rea-
soning results in an "all or nothing" outcome because the fourth
amendment protections hinge on the finding of a search or seizure.28
Once a court finds that a search or seizure has occurred, then it
considers the issue of reasonableness. Traditionally, probable cause29
served as the measuring stick for determining not only the presence of
the prerequisite factors for the issuance of a warrant, but also whether
a warrantless search or seizure was reasonable.3 ° Without probable
cause the search or seizure failed to meet the reasonableness require-
ment and evidence uncovered as a result was inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule.3'
Since 196732 the Court has created more and more exceptions to
the warrant requirement, 33 the probable cause requirement, 34 and in
25. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (The Court distinguished be-
tween search by private party and search by government official).
26. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (legiti-
mate expectation of privacy test established to determine areas protected by the fourth
amendment).
27. Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 388.
28. Id.
29. Probable cause is defined as more than mere suspicion. It exists where "the facts and
circumstances within ... [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
belief that an offense has been or is being committed .... Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
30. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). "[A] relaxation of the fundamental
requirements of probable cause would 'leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers'
whim or caprice.'" Id. at 479 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176).
31. All evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure is excluded from evi-
dence at trial under the fourth amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"[A]lI evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
While the exclusionary rule is still the law today, it has come under increased fire during
the last two decades, mainly because of the incredible burden it places on law enforcement
agencies. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See generally W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 81 (1985). In 1974 the Court ap-
peared to be positioning itself to either limit or possibly abandon the rule altogether. See
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). A majority of the Court stated that the rule
was "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights .... " and
thus, not a constitutionally protected right. Id. at 348. Now, however, the Court may be
taking an alternative course of action. See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
32. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
33. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plain view exception); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (containers within auto exception); United States v. Watson, 423
410
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some instances both requirements 3" of the fourth amendment. While
the use of warrant requirement exceptions is well settled, 6 the courts
have consistently required a showing of probable cause.
The Court began laying the foundation for acceptance of a war-
rantless search based on less than traditional probable cause38 in
Camara v. Municipal Court. 9 In that case, the Court developed a
sliding-scale approach' which attempted to balance the interest of
the state against that of the individual.4 ' Although the Court did not
abandon the probable cause standard, it appeared to create a per se
administrative standard for probable cause in the case of health and
safety inspections.42
The following year, in Terry v. Ohio,43 the Court for the first time
directly addressed the applicability of the probable cause standard in
certain law enforcement investigatory stops. The Court reasoned that
a stop and frisk was a lesser intrusion than a full search or full arrest'
and, therefore, the officer need only establish a "reasonable suspicion"
to satisfy the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement.4"
U.S. 411 (1976) (arrest in public area exception); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974)
(exterior of auto exception); and Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (hot pursuit exception).
34. See Camara, 387 U.S. 523. Health, building, fire, and other administrative inspectors
could not enter private property without a search warrant; however, the inspector did not have
to establish probable cause to obtain the warrant. Administrative or legislative action pro-
vided the probable cause simply because the building belonged to a particular class of
structures.
35. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (student search exception); Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (inventory search exception); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692 (1981) (detainment of owner of house with valid search warrant exception); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (stop and frisk exception).
36. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless automobile search for evi-
dence was lawful).
37. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 31, § 3.8, at 177.
38. See supra note 29.
39. 387 U.S. 523.
40. R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN EXAMINA-
TION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS 595 (1985). "Pursuant to this ap-
proach, the Court has considered whether some relatively unintrusive governmental activities
can legally be engaged in without the traditional, individualized probable cause showing." Id.
41. 387 U.S. at 536-37.
42. Id. at 537-38.
43. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
44. Id. at 24-26. The Court found that a fourth amendment seizure occurred but bal-
anced the need to ensure the officer's safety against the brief intrusion.
45. "[A]n objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken
was appropriate." Id. at 21-22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
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The cornerstone of the Court's decision was the officer's ability
to show "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion."" The reasonable suspicion standard led to the development of
the law enforcement profiles.47
The Federal Aviation Administration instituted the first "pro-
file" in 1968.48 It served as only one phase of a multi-faceted screen-
ing system established to deter the hijacking of U.S. airliners.4 9 The
characteristics of the profile remain secret, but it is known that ap-
proximately twenty-five characteristics make up the profile.5" These
traits are based on behavioral traits exhibited by passengers. 1 In
United States v. Lopez, 52 the district court stated that, absent the ele-
ments of discretion or prejudice, the described screening system was
consistent with the protections of the fourth amendment.53
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 54 a case involving the smug-
gling of illegal aliens across the Mexican border, the Court discussed
seven profile characteristics that could lead to reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.55 Six years later in United States v. Cortez16 another
46. Id. at 21.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Lopez involved
a hijacker profile where the court cited Terry in concluding that a court must (1) require an
officer to base the stop on objective evidence (specific and articulable facts), (2) balance the risk
to the community against the limited intrusion of the individual, and (3) determine if the
"frisk" was reasonable. The court also noted the frisk must be based on more than a mere
hunch but less than traditional probable cause. Id. at 1093. See also United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1985) (alimentary canal drug smuggler profile); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-82 (1975) (illegal alien smuggler profile).
48. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected That Th' Infected Spy, As All
Looks Yellow To The Jaundic'd Eye," 65 N.C.L. REV. 417, 423 n.45 (1987).
49. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 10.6, at 328-29. The screening program includes
(1) notice to the public, (2) use of a hijacker profile, (3) use of a magnetometer, (4) interviews
with selected passengers, and (5) frisks or searches of suspected passengers. Id.
50. Becton, supra note 48, at 423 n.45.
51. Id.
52. 328 F. Supp. 1077.
53. Id. at 1101. While the court upheld the profile, the profile alone is not sufficient for a
stop. The entire screening process must be applied to justify the detainment of a passenger and
avoid a fourth amendment violation.
54. 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (a random roving border patrol stop case).
55. The Court noted (1) traveling near the border; (2) on a lightly traveled road; (3) in a
notorious smuggling area; (4) in a car that appears to be heavily loaded or has an extraordinary
number of passengers or has large compartments suitable for storing aliens; (5) driven by
someone of Mexican ancestry; (6) who takes evasive action or drives erratically; and (7) who is
carrying passengers exhibiting characteristics of Mexican residents who appear to be trying to
hide. Id. at 884-85. The Court held that Mexican ancestry alone did not establish reasonable
suspicion that the occupants of the car were aliens. Id. at 885-86.
56. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
412
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alien smuggling case, the Court held that a border patrol officer had a
"particularized suspicion" based upon the totality of the circum-
stances that satisfied the fourth amendment reasonableness
standard.57
The Court alluded to an alimentary canal smuggler profile in
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez.5" In this case, DEA agents
detained the defendant for more than twenty-seven hours because she
fit the profile. 59 The Court held that the detention was justified if the
agents, "considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her
trip, reasonably suspect[ed] that the traveler [was] smuggling contra-
band . . . ." The Court went on to say that "[u]nder this standard
officials at the border must have a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person of alimentary canal smuggling. ' 6
The Terry analysis of reasonable suspicion based upon specific
and articulable facts underlines the courts' reasoning in all profile
cases.62 While the decisions in the aforementioned cases by no means
stated the acceptance of profiles to establish reasonable suspicion,
these cases show the Court's willingness to cumulate the specific facts
which alone are sufficient to establish the required reasonable
suspicion.
Beginning in the mid 1970s, Drug Enforcement Administration
officials began compiling certain traits of drug couriers in an attempt
to develop a profile. 63 From 1977 to 1982, the number of drug courier
profile characteristics flourished as many airports and local drug en-
forcement units developed their own profiles. 6M
57. Id. at 417-18. The Court stated that "(b]ased upon [the totality of the circumstances]
the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particu-
lar person stopped of criminal activity .. " This assessment contains two elements, each of
which must be present to justify a stop. The first element requires that "the assessment must
be based upon all the circumstances." Second, this process "must raise a suspicion that the
particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." Id. at 418.
58. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
59. The defendant (1) did not recall how her ticket was purchased, (2) came from a source
city, (3) carried five thousand dollars in U.S. currency, (4) had made many trips of short
duration into the United States, (5) had no family or friends in the country, (6) did not speak
English, and (7) planned to use a taxicab for transportation. Id. at 533.
60. Id. at 541-42.
61. Id. at 541.
62. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
63. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980).
64. "[T]here is no national profile; each airport unit developed its own set of drug courier
characteristics on the basis of that unit's experience . . . ." Becton, supra note 48, at 433
(quoting Petition for Certiorari at 17-18 n. 17, Mendenhall (No. 78-1821)). Compare United
States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983) (suspect
deplaned first) with United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980) (suspect deplaned
1989-901
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The Elmore profile,6" used widely throughout the country, in-
cludes eleven basic factors.66 The primary characteristics are: (1) ar-
riving from or departing to an identified drug source city; (2) carrying
little or no luggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases; (3) travel-
ing by an unusual itinerary; (4) using an alias; (5) carrying unusually
large amounts of cash; (6) purchasing airline tickets with a large
amount of small denomination currency; and (7) displaying unusual
nervousness. 67  The secondary characteristics are: (1) using public
transportation, particularly taxicabs, almost exclusively in departing
from the airport; (2) using the phone immediately after deplaning;
(3) leaving a fictitious callback telephone number with the airline; and
(4) traveling to source or distribution cities with excessive
frequency.6 a
During the early 1980s, the Court heard three drug courier pro-
last); United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir.), vacated, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th
Cir. 1987) (suspect took flight requiring a plane change) with United States v. McCaleb, 552
F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977) (suspect took non-stop flight); United States v. Himmelwright,
551 F.2d 991, 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (suspect acted too calm) with
United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 1979) (suspect acted nervous); United
States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982) (suspect
possessed gym bag) with United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir. 1980) (suspect
purchased one-way ticket to source city and possessed new luggage) and United States v.
Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977) (suspect purchased round-trip ticket to source city
and possessed no luggage).
65. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 910 (1980). DEA agent Paul Markonni, who is often credited with developing the first
"drug courier profile," identified seven "primary characteristics" and four "secondary charac-
teristics" that make up the profile at the suppression hearing. See infra notes 67-68 and ac-
companying text. When Elmore was detained by the DEA agents, they had determined that
Elmore had traveled from a "source city," had no baggage, used an alias, exhibited an unusual
degree of nervousness, purchased his ticket with cash, and returned from Detroit less than
sixteen hours after his arrival. 595 F.2d at 1038-40. See also United States v. Ballard, 573
F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
66. In Elmore the court divided the eleven profile characteristics developed by Ballard
into seven primary characteristics and four secondary characteristics. 595 F.2d at 1039 n.3.
67. Id. Even the facts of the Supreme Court's decisions involving drug courier profiles
contain traits very similar to those found in the Elmore profile. In Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
the Court cited four profile traits: (1) traveling from a source city; (2) nervousness; (3) using
an unusual traveling itinerary; and (4) no luggage. Id. at 547 n. 1. The Court found five char-
acteristics in Reid: (1) traveling from a source city; (2) using unusual itinerary; (3) carrying
very little luggage; (4) nervousness; and (5) the defendants hiding the fact that they were trav-
eling together. 448 U.S. at 441. In Royer the Court found six factors: (1) nervousness;
(2) paid for tickets in cash with large number of bills; (3) using an alias; (4) between 25-35;
(5) carrying heavy luggage; and (6) dressed casually. 460 U.S. at 493 n.2.
68. 595 F.2d at 1039 n.3. The primary characteristics derive from logical deductions
about the practicalities of the drug business. The secondary characteristics are more likely to
misidentify innocent travelers as drug couriers. See Becton, supra note 48, at 432.
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file cases,69 but these decisions only added to the confusion surround-
ing drug courier stops and the validity of the profile.7° While the
Court never cited the Elmore characteristics, at least four of these
traits were found in each case.
The Court first addressed the issue in United States v. Menden-
hall71 in May 1980. In Mendenhall four profile characteristics first
established in Elmore were present.72 A plurality of the Court de-
cided that the profile characteristics were sufficient for an agent to
establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior to make a Terry
stop.
7 3
One month later on June 30, 1980, the Court in Reid v. Georgia74
held that the profile itself did not automatically give rise to the rea-
sonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity required under
Terry.75 The same four characteristics that were present in Menden-
hall existed in this case.76 However, the Court, in a per curiam opin-
ion, failed to even mention Mendenhall while finding that the agent
lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to make a permissi-
ble stop.77
The Court addressed the profile issue for the third time in as
many years in Florida v. Royer.71 The defendant in this case matched
six profile traits, 79 but the Court overturned the defendant's convic-
69. The Supreme Court has questionably heard a fourth case, but the Court failed to
mention the drug courier profile by name or recognize any profile traits. Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1 (1984).
70. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
71. 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality).
72. Id. at 547 n. 1. The defendant (1) arrived from a source city, (2) appeared to be "very
nervous," (3) claimed no luggage, and (4) changed airlines for her flight from Detroit [unusual
itinerary]. Id. All four traits meet the Elmore profile. See supra note 66 and accompanying
text.
73. 446 U.S. at 560. Two Justices decided that no seizure occurred at all. Id. at 552-54.
Three Justices concluded that the agents had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. Id. at
560.
74. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 441. A five member majority reversed Reid's conviction.
76. Id. at 441. The defendants (1) arrived from a source city, (2) arrived in the early
morning [unusual itinerary], (3) carried only a shoulder bag [little or no luggage], and (4) ap-
peared to be nervous. Also, the agents observed that the defendants were traveling separately,
but met as they were leaving the terminal. Id. The first four traits correspond with the Elmore
profile. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 73.
78. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
79. Id. at 493 n.2. The defendant (1) appeared nervous, (2) paid for his ticket in cash with
a large number of bills, (3) did not put his real name on his airline identification tag, (4) was
casually dressed, (5) was between 25-35 years of age, and (6) carried sturdy luggage. Id. The
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tion before it decided the validity of the profile.80 Justice White, writ-
ing a plurality opinion, contradicted the Reid decision by implying
that reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to justify a Terry
stop.81
The most recent opportunity for the Court to consider the drug
courier profile came in the instant case of United States v. Sokolow.8 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began the opinion
by stating the requirements for a Terry stop. 3 Under Terry a brief
stop without probable cause may be constitutional "if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal ac-
tivity 'may be afoot' .... ,84
Reasonable suspicion entails "some minimal level of objective
justification" for making a stop.8 5  At the very least, the fourth
amendment requires an officer to articulate something more than an
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' " to make a
stop.8 6 However, the level of suspicion needed for a Terry stop is con-
siderably less demanding 7 than the "fair probability" needed for an
arrest. 8
The Court next considered the concept of reasonable suspicion
and the circumstances that satisfy its existence.8 9 The Court in Soko-
low found that the Ninth Circuit's "reasonable suspicion" test created
unnecessary difficulties and confusion.9" The totality of the circum-
stances approach was reaffirmed by the Court as the appropriate
means for determining the existence of reasonable suspicion.9 As a
result, the Court overturned the rule established by the Ninth
first three traits fall within the Elmore primary characteristics. See supra note 67 and accom-
panying text.
80. 460 U.S. at 507-08. The Court concluded that when the officers refused to return his
driver's license, his airline ticket, and his luggage, as a practical matter, he was under arrest.
Id. at 503.
81. Id. at 502.
82. 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
83. Id. at 1585.
84. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
85. Id. (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).
86. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
87. Id. (See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)).
88. Id. The Court stated that probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of crime will be found." Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
89. Id. at 1585-87.
90. 831 F.2d 1413, 1419-21 (1987). The Ninth Circuit established a two-category analysis
for determining if reasonable suspicion exists. Id. The Court stated that reasonable suspicion,
like probable cause, cannot be reduced to a predetermined checklist of rules. 109 S. Ct. at
1585.




The Chief Justice noted that the profile characteristics taken
alone are not proof of illegal conduct, but to the contrary, are quite
common among innocent travelers.93 By applying the totality of the
circumstances approach, however, the innocent characteristics taken
as a whole may amount to a reasonable suspicion for making a Terry
stop.94 Rehnquist attempted to bolster this reasoning by citing in-
stances where the Court held that a series of innocent acts provided
the basis for a showing of probable cause.95 In fact, Terry itself was
based upon "a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent ... but
which taken together warranted further investigation. 96
Thus, the majority implicitly approved the use of drug courier
profiles to establish a basis for reasonable suspicion. 97 The Court rea-
soned that the agents must have specific and articulable facts before a
reasonable suspicion is established. 98 The agents' use of the profile
characteristics as the framework for the development of specific and
articulable facts did not detract from their evidentiary significance.99
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, stating
that the case failed to pass the Terry requirements for a stop based on
reasonable suspicion." The dissenters stated that the majority's deci-
sion diminished the rights not only of the guilty, but of all citizens as
they travel across the country.1"1
Justice Marshall noted that under Terry the officer must reason-
ably believe that crime is afoot, crime is imminent, or the officer's
safety is in danger to make a stop. 102 The Court in Terry also referred
to the officer's ability to make fact-specific inferences "in light of his
'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
92. Id. at 1586. "The rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals [Ninth Circuit] ... is not
in keeping with quoted statements from our decisions." Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1587 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983)).
96. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
97. Id. The majority found that the agents had reasonable suspicion to make a stop of
Sokolow because he was a suspected drug courier. Thus, the Court established the use of a
drug courier profile as an appropriate set of guidelines in determining the existence of specific
and articulable facts. Id. at 1586-87.
98. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
99. 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
100. Id. at 1588 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
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experience." 103 In the present case, there was no apparent crime afoot
and the inferences were based on a checklist of characteristics rather
than on the officers' experience. °4
Another criticism raised by Justice Marshall was the profile's
"chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observa-
tions." 105 Marshall then cited fourteen cases as examples where con-
tradictory characteristics were used in various profiles to show the
existence of reasonable suspicion. "o6 Because no official national pro-
file exists, the Drug Enforcement Administration and local law en-
forcement agencies can adapt the profile to fit the particular facts of
any case. 107
Justice Marshall's final criticism dealt with recent decisions of
the Court involving drug crimes and anti-drug policies. 0 8 Marshall
stated that the majority's recent decisions had given "short shrift to
constitutional rights" when drug issues were decided. 1°9
Although the Court has decided several drug courier profile
cases, 1 0 the decision in Sokolow marked the first time the Court has
taken a firm position on the issue. The key to the decision centered
upon United States v. Cortez,"' a case involving the totality of the
circumstances approach in conjunction with profile-like factors. In
the two cases preceding Cortez, the Court considered the dilemma of
determining which profile characteristics gave rise to a reasonable sus-
picion of criminal activity. " 2 This dilemma possibly explains why the
103. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
104. Id. at 1588. Factors mentioned by the majority included: (1) nervousness; (2) travel-
ing to or from a source city; (3) using different name for airline telephone callback number;
(4) paying for tickets in cash; (5) defendant's attire; (6) not checking any luggage; and (7) short
stay in source city. Id. at 1583. In Justice Marshall's dissent, he gave possible innocent expla-
nations for these profile traits. Id. at 1589-90. Justice Marshall also noted that in Terry the
officer based his suspicion upon thirty years of experience, not on a "mechanistic application of
a formula." Id. at 1588.
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)).
106. 109 S. Ct. at 1588. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
107. 109 S. Ct. at 1588.
108. Id. at 1591. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989).
109. 109 S. Ct. at 1591.
110. See supra note 69.
111. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
112. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) and Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438 (1980). The facts in Mendenhall and Reid were almost identical. The Court in Menden-
hall said a reasonable suspicion existed, while in Reid, the Court ruled the stop impermissible
for lack of reasonable suspicion. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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contradicting opinions were issued within a month of each other.' 3
The Court in Florida v. Royer did not use the Cortez reasoning
because the Court decided the case on another fourth amendment is-
sue."14 However, Royer represented the first time a clear majority ap-
proved the use of the profile characteristics for supporting the
reasonable suspicion needed for a stop." 5
The reasoning in Cortez played a very significant part in the
Court's analysis in Sokolow."'6 Chief Justice Rehnquist combined the
Cortez totality of the circumstances approach with the Terry articul-
able facts requirement to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion
standard." 7 Under this analysis, the impact of Sokolow may reach far
beyond the facts of the case. As the majority in Sokolow stated, "the
factors in question have evidentiary significance regardless of whether
they are set forth in a 'profile.' "118 This reasoning, in effect, gives law
enforcement officials the Court's blessing to use profiles as a valid po-
lice tool.
The Court's acceptance of profiles cause several practical
problems. First, by applying this analysis, the Court firmly puts the
discretion of the existence of reasonable suspicion in the hands of the
field officer. The judges' role in the judicial process might dwindle
from one of an independent reviewer of fact to one of a monitor of
investigatory formulas.' 19 This outcome could result in a greater like-
lihood of pretext searches and discrimination by the law enforcement
community and, in turn, to a greater reduction in fourth amendment
rights.
Even if a police officer exhibits no prejudice and the defendant
meets the profile criteria, a question remains as to the predictive value
of profiles. Some profiles are undoubtedly more reliable than others;
however, legal scholars claim that predictive schemes in any form are
113. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (decided May 27, 1980); Reid, 448 U.S. 438 (decided
June 30, 1980).
114. See supra note 80.
115. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). Justice White's plurality opinion, joined by three other justices,
approved the profiles as a basis for reasonable suspicion. Id. at 502. Justice Powell's concur-
rence also approved the use of the profile. Id. at 508. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion
stated that the agents had reasonable suspicion based upon the factors of the profile. Id. at
518.
116. 109 S. Ct. at 1585-87.
117. "Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite
consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together, they amount to reasonable suspi-
cion." Id. at 1586 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 1587.
119. McCloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial
Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U.L. REV. 843, 857 (1985).
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not accurate because they do not treat "individuals as autonomous
persons.' 12° Also, by using predictive models (profiles), police agents
will only observe couriers that fit the profile's traits. Therefore, agents
looking for Hispanic female couriers, for example, would not arrest
white male couriers.' 2'
Likewise, a question remains as to what characteristics in a pro-
file, taken as a whole, justify reasonable suspicion. The majority in
Sokolow only stated that the traits have "evidentiary significance,"
and made no mention of the minimum level required to demonstrate
reasonable suspicion. 122 This could result in courts using a case-by-
case analysis to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion, and
thereby adding to the already confusing past of the profile. 23
In Arkansas, the effects of Sokolow could be felt much sooner
than in other states. Arkansas, like many southern states, has used a
type of drug courier profile on its interstate highway system. 24 How-
ever, in 1988, the Arkansas State Police's highway profile suffered a
setback by the decision in McElrath v. Goodwin.' 25  The case dealt
with a "consent decree" that the State Police entered into earlier that
year which, among other things, required the troopers to have a "con-
sent to search" form read by all traffic violators before a search could
be performed.1 26 Judge Eisele ruled that the decree required that the
violator sign the consent form before allowing a search. 27
Earlier this year, the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Stafford v.
State 28 held that since neither the United States nor the Arkansas
Supreme Court has rendered an opinion on this matter, local law en-
120. Becton, supra note 48, at 429 (citing Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ballk Predict-
ing Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1409
(1979)).
121. Becton, supra note 48, at 430 (citing Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Sus-
pect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 216 (1983)).
122. 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
123. McCloud, supra note 119, at 860. "No court has been more guilty of failing to come
to grips with the meaning of the drug courier profile than the United States Supreme Court."
Id.
124. McCloud, supra note 119, at 854-55 n.47-50.
125. 713 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Ark. 1988).
126. Id. at 300-01. Subsection (f) of the consent decree stated that:
A vehicle consent search form will be adopted in both English and Spanish in sub-
stantially the form appended to this order, providing at least:
(1) The driver or person in apparent control shall be told of the right to refuse,
limit, or revoke consent.
(2) The driver or person in apparent control shall be told that they will be
allowed to go on their way if consent is denied.
127. Id. at 304.
128. Stafford v. State, No. CACR 88-265 (Ark. Ct. App. May 10, 1989) (LEXIS 239).
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forcement officials were not subject to the consent decree entered into
by the State Police. Because local and state law enforcement officials
often work together, this created a confusing double standard on
whether consent is necessary when both local and state officials are
present. 129
The Attorney General's office and attorneys for the Arkansas
State Police are currently preparing to petition for a rehearing of Mc-
Elrath based on the Supreme Court's decision in Sokolow. 30 If Judge
Eisele grants the petition and rules that Sokolow represents "new
law," then the highway profile could once again appear on Arkansas
highways.
Alec Farmer
129. Telephone interview with Darrel Staten, staff attorney of the Arkansas State Police
(July 6, 1989).
130. Telephone interview with Mark Lewis, Assistant Attorney General of the State of
Arkansas (July 6, 1989).
1989-901

